The stock of unemployed workers changes over time depending on the number of new jobs which are created by firms (job creation flows) and on the number of jobs which are lost thus causing an employed worker to enter unemployment (job destruction flows). The key to understanding the cyclical behaviour of unemployment is to understand how these flows vary over time. The purpose of this paper is to identify a rich but tractable dynamic framework of job flows which can be used for both macro policy applications and micro empirical analysis.
Non-technical summary
The stock of unemployed workers changes over time depending on the number of new jobs which are created by firms (job creation flows) and on the number of jobs which are lost thus causing an employed worker to enter unemployment (job destruction flows). The key to understanding the cyclical behaviour of unemployment is to understand how these flows vary over time. The purpose of this paper is to identify a rich but tractable dynamic framework of job flows which can be used for both macro policy applications and micro empirical analysis.
Unlike a competitive economy where all firms pay the same wage (given equally productive workers), here we characterise an efficiency wage model of quit turnover. Specifically equilibrium has the property that high productivity firms pay higher wages than do lower productivity firms. The advantage to this strategy is that hiring (and training) new workers is a costly process and so paying higher wages, to induce lower quit rates, raises the expected payoff of the new hire. We identify such an equilibrium in a signalling framework: a firm's productivity is not directly observed by employees. Because we assume a firm's productivity is also a persistent (auto-regressive) process, posting a high wage today is not only a signal of high productivity today but also of high productivity in the future. Equilibrium wages then have an auctiontype structure: high productivity firms bid higher wages than do low productivity firms so that, should an employee at a low productivity firm receive an outside offer from a higher productivity firm holding a vacancy, the employee quits to the better paid job. It turns out that this auction structure is remarkably tractable. We can not only characterise equilibrium wage dispersion across both firms and workers at any point in time, we also allow firm turnover, where new start-up firms begin life small but potentially grow to be large, and also outside of steady state so that the economy evolves endogenously.
The basic framework assumes all new start-up firms are initially small where some start-ups are more productive than others. High productivity start-ups pay high wages, enjoy positive expected growth rates and typically grow quickly over time. Low productivity start-ups instead have negative expected growth rates and so struggle to succeed. The theoretical framework yields a coherent explanation of (i) wage dispersion across employed workers; (ii) wage dispersion across firms, (iii) quit rates across workers and (iv) dispersion in individual firm growth rates. We identify restrictions on the model characteristics so that the equilibrium outcomes are consistent with empirical wage distributions across workers and across firms. Specifically we show that the assumed productivity distribution across new start-up firms must have a decreasing density. Thus most start-ups are born with low productivity and struggle to succeed. A relative minority of start-ups instead grow quickly over time, their growth rates depending on their productivity but not on their size; e.g. Gibrat's Law, Haltiwanger et al. (2011) . The model is shown to fit many important aspects of micro-data.
A major contribution of the paper, however, is it also provides a complete analytical characterization of equilibrium labor market adjustment outside of a steady state. It thus not only provides a useful framework for understanding how wage dispersion and firm growth rates vary over time as unemployment changes, it has important implications for the lifetime career opportunities of new labour market entrants.
Introduction
The model studied in this paper is one in which employers set the wage paid in the tradition of Diamond (1971), Burdett and Judd (1983) , Burdett and Mortensen (1998) , Coles (2001) and Moscarini and Postel-Vinay (2010) . It di¤ers from these papers by introducing (i) recruiting behavior at a cost of the form estimated by Merz and Yashiv (2007) , (ii) …rm entry and exit, and (iii) …rm speci…c productivity shocks. Its purpose is to identify a rich but tractable dynamic variant of the Burdett-Mortensen (BM) model that can be used for both macro policy applications and micro empirical analysis.
The framework developed contains several key contributions. First, we show that introducing a hiring margin into the BM model results in a surprisingly tractable structure. In the existing BM framework, wages are chosen both to attract and to retain employees and equilibrium wage dispersion arises in which the wage paid by a …rm depends on its size. In contrast equilibrium wage and hiring strategies here depend only on …rm productivity and the state of the aggregate economy. The resulting structure generates equilibrium dispersion in individual …rm growth rates which, consistent with Gibrat's law, are size independent as documented in Haltiwanger et al. (2011) . In particular more productive …rms pay higher wages, enjoy positive expected growth, and so generally become larger. Low productivity …rms instead decline because their low hire rate is not su¢ cient to replace employees quitting to better paying jobs.
In Moscarini and Postel-Vinay (2010), the existence of a (recursive rankpreserving) equilibrium in the BM framework requires a restriction on initial conditions. Speci…cally, because the wage strategy is size dependent in their model, higher paying …rms must be larger initially to guarantee equilibrium. Unfortunately this condition is violated in real data because …rms die and new start-up companies are typically small. The framework established here explicitly incorporates innovative start-up companies who are born small but (depending on realized productivity) can grow quickly over time. Conversely large existing …rms may experience adverse productivity shocks and so enter periods of decline.
As a second key contribution, we suppose no future wage precommitment. Wages are determined in a model of asymmetric information where each …rm's productivity p 2 [p; p], which is subject to shocks, is private information to the …rm. As workers are long-lived, they care about the future expected income stream at any given employer. In this framework …rm pro-ductivity is a persistent process: a high productivity …rm is more likely than a low productivity …rm to be highly productive tomorrow. As employees are more valuable to high productivity …rms, a signalling equilibrium arises where more productive …rms pay higher wages and, consequently, enjoy a lower quit rate. The lower quit rate occurs as employees believe the …rm is not only highly productive today but is more likely to remain highly productive into the future and so will continue to pay high wages.
The equilibrium structure is thus not unlike an e¢ ciency wage model of quit turnover (e.g. Weiss (1980) ). Unlike a competitive economy where all …rms pay the same wage (given equally productive workers), here high productivity …rms pay higher wages to reduce the quit rate of its employees to better paying …rms. Should a …rm cut its wage, its employees believe the …rm has experienced an adverse productivity shock. Given the fall in expected future earnings at this …rm, this wage cut triggers a corresponding increase in employee quit rates.
Perhaps the central contribution of the paper, however, is the characterization of equilibrium labor market adjustment outside of steady state. The standard matching framework (e.g. Pissarides (2000) ) determines wages via a Nash bargaining condition, so that wages depend only on the current state of the market s t ; and then describes dynamic (Markov) equilibria (e.g. Mortensen and Pissarides (1994) ). In contrast equilibrium wages here are determined according to a signalling condition but this rule is also Markov, depending only on the current state s t which determines the distribution of current …rm values. The resulting structure not only generates equilibrium wage dispersion across employed workers, its in…mum is pinned down by the value of home productivity b which ensures wages are not fully ‡exible over the cycle. Furthermore being a model of aggregate job creation (…rm recruitment strategies) and of job-to-job transitions (via on-the-job search), it identi…es a coherent, non-steady state framework of equilibrium wage formation and labor force adjustment. By focussing on Markov perfect (Bayesian) equilibria, the framework can be readily extended to a business cycle structure where the economy is itself subject to aggregate shocks.
Given the restrictions on primitives needed to guarantee the existence of bounded values for all agents in our model, we show that a unique separating equilibrium exists in the limiting case of equally productive …rms. Formally, any equilibrium solution is isomorphic to the stable saddle path of an ordinary di¤erential equation system that describes the adjustment dynamics of the value of a job-worker match and aggregate unemployment to their 3 unique steady state values. In the case of …rm heterogeneity with respect to productivity, we establish the existence of at least one separating equilibrium when the distribution of …rm productivity limits to a …nite number of …rm types.
Menzio and Shi (2010) develop and study a recursive model of directed search that also allows for search on-the-job. In their paper, they suggest that directed search is a more useful approach for understanding labor market dynamics. They claim that models of random search in the BurdettMortensen tradition are intractable because the decision relevant state space is the evolving distribution of wages, which is of in…nite dimension. Although the directed search model is arguably simpler in some respects, their principal objection to a random search model is not valid in the variant considered in the paper. Indeed, in the limiting case of equally productive …rms, the relevant state variable is simply the aggregate level of unemployment, a scalar.
A troublesome implication of the original Burdett-Mortensen model for empirical implementation is that the equilibrium …rm wage distribution is convex in the case of homogenous …rms while in the data it has an interior mode. Although a unimodal distribution is possible when …rms di¤er in labor productivity, Mortensen (2003) shows that model is not consistent with both the observed …rm wage distribution and the distribution of …rm productivity in Danish data. In the case of our model, the implied distribution of …rm wages generally has an interior mode given the form of the roughly linear but decreasing wage-productivity pro…le observed in (Danish) data. Furthermore, the model is fully consistent with this shape under the plausible restriction that the productivity density over new entrants is decreasing and converges to zero.
The Model
Time is continuous. The labor market is populated by a unit measure of equally productive, risk neutral and immortal workers who discount the future at instantaneous rate r. Every worker is either unemployed or employed, earns a wage if employed, and the ‡ow value of home production, b 0, if not. There is also a measure of risk neutral, heterogeneous …rms. Market output is produced by a matched worker and …rm with a linear technology.
New …rms enter at rate > 0; continuing …rms die at rate > 0 so that the measure of …rms is stationary and equal to = : At entry, the productivity of a new …rm p is determined as a random draw from the c.d.f. 0 (:): Continuing …rms with productivity p are subject to a technology shock process characterized by a given arrival rate 0 and a distribution of new values from c.d.f. 1 (:jp): For ease of exposition, 0 ; 1 are continuous functions: As in Klette and Kortum (2004) and Lentz and Mortensen (2008) , one can think of the entry ‡ow as …rms with new products and the exit ‡ow as …rms that are destroyed because their product is no longer in demand.
Given the above productivity and turnover processes, it is a straightforward algebraic exercise to compute the stationary distribution of …rm productivity (p): It is convenient, however, to instead rank …rms by their productivity; i.e. a …rm with productivity p is equivalently described as having rank x 2 [0; 1] solving x = (p): The inverse function p(x) = 1 (x) then identi…es the productivity of a …rm with rank x: For the main part, we assume p(:) is a strictly increasing function with p(0) > b and denote p(1) = p. De…ne b 0 (x) = 0 (p(x)) and b 1 (:jx) = 1 (:jp(x)) which thus describe the above productivity processes but in rank space x 2 [0; 1]: Throughout we require …rst order stochastic dominance in b 1 (:jx); so that higher productivity …rms x are more likely to remain more productive into the future. Let [0; x(x)] denote the support of b 1 (:jx) which we assume is connected and that lim x!0 + x(x) = 0 so that productivity rank x = 0 is an absorbing state [till …rm death].
Each …rm is characterized by (x; n; s) where x summarizes its productivity rank (with corresponding productivity p = p(x)); n is the (integer) number of employees and s represents the aggregate market state. Throughout we only consider Markov Perfect (Bayesian) equilibria where the market state process s t is Markov and known to all agents. As all agents are small, each takes this process as given. Below we shall establish that the payo¤ relevant state s t at date t is the distribution function N t (:) describing the total number of workers employed at …rms with rank no greater than x: In equilibrium N t (:) evolves according to a simple …rst order di¤erential equation.
There is asymmetric information at the …rm level: each …rm knows its productivity type x but its employees do not. Given the history of observed wages at this …rm, each employee generates beliefs on the …rm's current type x and so computes W (:) denoting the expected value of employment at this …rm.
New …rms enter with a single worker, the innovator. Once a new …rm enters, the innovator sells the …rm to risk neutral investors for its value and reverts to his/her role as a worker. Each …rm faces costs of expanding its labour force. If a …rm with n employees decides to recruit an additional worker at rate H; then the cost of recruitment is nc(H=n) where H=n is the recruitment e¤ort required per employee in vetting job applicants and training new hires. Assume c(:) is increasing and strictly convex with c
Recruitment is random in that any hire is a random draw from the set of workers with expected lifetime value less than W where W denotes the expected lifetime payo¤ of a worker at the hiring …rm. This also implies workers quit a …rm if they receive an outside o¤er with (perceived) value strictly greater than current W: We let (s) denote the arrival rate of (outside) job o¤ers in aggregate state s and (s)F (W; s) denote the arrival rate of such o¤ers with value no greater than W . Finally at rate each worker, whether employed or unemployed, conceives a new business idea and so has the opportunity to start-up a new …rm. We assume the worker always chooses to accept the opportunity and so describes the entry rate of new …rms. 1 
Firm Size Invariance.
Firms in this paper signal their productivity x through their choice of wage w. In BM, more productive …rms pay higher wages to attract and to retain more employees than do less productive …rms. The same insight applies here: higher productivity …rms have a greater willingness to pay a higher wage to reduce employee quit rates. In the following we identify a separating equilibrium in which each …rm (x; n; s) uses an optimal wage strategy w = w(x; n; s) which is strictly increasing in x: Assuming workers observe the number of employees at the …rm n and the market state s, then the current wage paid fully reveals the …rm's type x. In what follows, however, we shall focus entirely on optimal strategies that are also …rm size invariant. Such an equilibrium has the following critical properties: (i) the …rm's optimal wage strategy does not depend on …rm size, and so (ii) optimal worker quit strategies do not depend on …rm size.
The restriction to …rm size invariance is most useful. Of course it may be that a …rm size invariant equilibrium does not exist (e.g. BM, Coles (2001), Moscarini and Postel-Vinay (2010)). The critical di¤erence here is that …rms have an additional policy choice -to recruit new employees with e¤ort H: As developed in Coles and Mortensen (2011) -though in a world of symmetric information and reputation e¤ects -equilibrium …nds the wage strategies are indeed …rm size independent, depending only on the …rm's productivity x: For ease of exposition we simply anticipate this result.
3 A Separating Equilibrium.
The following identi…es a separating equilibrium in which w(x; s) describes the optimal wage strategy of …rm (x; n; s) which is independent of …rm size n and is strictly increasing in x: In any such equilibrium, let b
x(w; s) denote the worker's belief on the …rm's type x given wage announcement w in aggregate state s: Of course a separating equilibrium requires b
x solves w = w(b x; s). Let W (x; s) denote the worker's expected value of employment at …rm (x; n; s); given belief b x = x: We start with some standard observations. First note that if a …rm pays wage w = b; it is not optimal for its employees to quit into unemploymentby remaining employed each worker retains the option of remaining employed at his/her current employer which has positive value (the …rm may possibly increase its wage tomorrow while the worker can always quit tomorrow if needs be). Assuming workers do not quit into unemployment if indi¤erent to doing so yields two key simpli…cations:
(S1) any …rm with n 1 must make strictly positive pro…t (as p(x) > b and the …rm can always post wage w = b); (S2) any equilibrium wage announcement w(x; s) by …rm (x; n; s) must yield employment value W (b x(w; s); s) at least as large as the value of unemployment, denoted as V u (s).
2 Thus all unemployed workers will accept the …rst job o¤er received.
As previously described, outside job o¤ers arrive at rate = (s) where F (W; s) is the fraction of job o¤ers in state s which o¤er employment value no greater than W: With no recall, the employee's optimal quit rate at a …rm (believed to be) b
x is then q(b x; s) = (s)[1 F (W (b x; s); s)] which does not depend on …rm size: Given this quit structure, consider now optimal …rm behavior.
Firm Optimality.
Because individual workers are hired and quit sequentially, the number of employees in a continuing …rm is a stochastic process. Indeed, the size of a …rm, denoted by n, is a birth-death process with an absorbing state that occurs when the …rm dies. That is over any su¢ ciently short time period of length dt > 0, the …rm's labor force size is an integer that can only transit from the value n to n + 1 if a worker is hired, from n to n 1 if a worker quits, or to zero if the …rm loses its market: The transition rates for these three events are respectively the hire frequency H(x; n; s), the quit frequency nq(b x; s) and the destruction frequency :
Suppose …rm (x; n; s) posts wage w; recruits new employees at rate h = H=n and employees infer the …rm is type x = b
x(w; s): Firm (x; n; s) thus chooses w; h to solve the Bellman equation:
(r+ ) (x; n; s) = max
In words the ‡ow value of the …rm equals its ‡ow pro…t less hiring costs plus the capital gains associated with (i) a successful hire (n ! n + 1) (ii) the loss of an employee through a quit (n ! n 1); and (iii) a …rm speci…c productivity shock with new draw z c 1 (:jx): The last term captures the e¤ect on (:) through the non-steady state evolution of s = s t . As the quit rate q(:) is …rm size invariant, it is immediate the solution to this Bellman equation is (x; n; s) = nv(x; s) where v(x; s); the value of each employee in …rm x; solves:
(1) The following tranversality condition is also necessary for a solution to this dynamic programming problem: 
Worker Optimality.
Consider …rm (x; n; s) which adopts the equilibrium wage strategy w = w(x; s). As an employee correctly infers …rm type x = b x(w; s) then, in a separating equilibrium, the worker's expected lifetime payo¤ given employment at …rm x is:
In other words, the ‡ow value of employment is equal to the wage income plus the expected capital gains associated with the possibility of …rm destruction, a …rm speci…c productivity shock, being o¤ered a better job elsewhere, creating a business start-up and capital gains as the state variable s evolves outside of steady state. Note this payo¤ does not depend on the quit strategies of colleagues as the wage paid does not depend on …rm size. Given that b 1 (:jx) is stochastically increasing in x and that a separating equilibrium requires w(x; s) is strictly increasing in x; it follows that the expected value of employment at …rm x; W (x; s); is strictly increasing in x: Proposition 1 now establishes a standard result. Proposition 1. In a separating equilibrium, W (0; s t ) = V u (s t ) for almost all t:
Proof: Strictly positive pro…t for …rm x = 0 implies W (0; s) V u (s) for all s: To establish the equality holds, we use a contradiction argument: Suppose instead V u (s t ) < W (0; s t ) over some non-empty time period t 2 [t 0 ; t 1 ): Thus throughout this time interval, being employed at the least productive …rm is strictly preferred to being unemployed. Suppose at any date t 2 [t 0 ; t 1 ); …rm x = 0 deviates and pays wage w = w(0; s t ) " where " > 0: Given this deviation, workers update their beliefs on the …rm's type b
x and choose a correspondingly optimal quit strategy. The worst case scenario, however, is that they believe the …rm is type b x = 0 and so anticipate employment value W (0; s ) > V u (s ) for all 2 (t; t 1 ) in the subgame: As this deviating wage is expected to be paid only for an instant it has an arbitrarily small impact on worker payo¤s and so employees at this …rm do not quit into unemployment, though each will quit to any outside o¤er (as b x = 0 and w < w(0; s t )). This quit strategy, however, is the same turnover strategy were …rm x = 0 to pay w = w(0; s t ): This contradicts equilibrium as …rm x = 0 can thus pro…tably deviate by announcing w = w(0; s t )) " while t 2 [t 0 ; t 1 ): This completes the proof of Proposition 1.
An immediate corollary to Proposition 1 is that a separating equilibrium implies w(0; s) = b:
This follows as, given all job o¤ers are acceptable, the value of being unemployed in a separating equilibrium is:
+ (s)
Putting x = 0 in (3), using (5) and noting that productivity state x = 0 is absorbing ( c 1 (0j0) = 1) then yields (4). As a separating equilibrium requires w(:) is strictly increasing in x; w(0; s) = b thus describes the lowest wage paid in the market.
The Value of an Employee.
Proposition 4 below determines the wage outcome in a separating equilibrium. Its derivation relies on the value of an employee v(:) being increasing in x and bounded for any state s: This section formally establishes this result. Equation (6) below identi…es an upper bound for v(:): Assumption 1 is a restriction on fundamental parameters which ensures this bound exists.
Assumption 1: A positive solution for v exists to
For any v 0; de…ne the hire function
The assumed properties of c(:) ensure h (v) is unique, non-negative, strictly increasing and di¤erentiable for all v 0. By establishing that the highest productivity …rms do not grow too quickly, Proposition 2 ensures the ergodic distribution of …rm sizes is well-de…ned. Proposition 2. h (v) : Proof. By the Envelope Theorem, the right hand side of equation (6) is an increasing, convex function of v with slope h (v)= : As the right hand side is also strictly positive at v = 0 then, given a positive solution exists for v; it satis…es h (v) : The Bellman equation (1) implies the optimal recruitment strategy of
Using Assumption 1, we now obtain the following crucial result. Proposition 3. The value of an employee v(x; s) is increasing in x and bounded above by v in every state s.
Proof. The forward solution to (1) that satis…es the transversality condition (2) along any arbitrary future time path for the state fs t g 1 0 is the …xed point of the following transformation
As q(b x(w z ; s z ); s z )) 0 in general and w t b by Proposition 1, it follows that
for any v(x; s) v. Because p(x) is increasing in x and c 1 (:jx) is stochastically increasing in x, (T v)(x; s t ) is increasing in x if v(x; s) is increasing in x. Thus the transformation T maps the set of uniformly bounded functions that are increasing in x into itself. Further, the transformation T is increasing and
In short, the map satis…es Blackwell's condition for a contraction map which thus guarantees that a unique …xed point exists in the set of bounded functions increasing in x. This completes the proof of Proposition 3.
Armed with this result we can now fully characterise the strategies of …rms and workers in a separating equilibrium.
Equilibrium Wage and Quit Strategies.
The Bellman equation (1) implies the optimal wage strategy minimizes the sum of the wage bill and turnover costs. 
where b x = b x(w; s): Characterizing the solution to (9) requires …rst characterising the equilibrium quit rate function q(:).
De…ne b F (x; s) as the fraction of job o¤ers made by …rms with type no greater than x in aggregate state s: As a separating equilibrium implies W = W (x; s) is strictly increasing in x; it follows that b F (x; s) = F (W (x; s); s): By now determining (s) and b F (x; s); the equilibrium quit rate function is given by q(x; s) = (s) [1 b F (x; s)] where x = b x describes the worker's (degenerate) belief on the …rm's type:
In state s = s t at date t; let G t (W ) denote the total number of workers in the economy with value no greater than W: As job o¤ers are random then, to hire at rate H = nh while o¤ering a wage which yields expected employment value W; the …rm must make job o¤ers at rate H=G t (W ) (as an o¤er is only accepted with probability G t ). But W (:) strictly increasing in x implies
, where recall N t (x) is the measure of workers employed at …rms of productivity rank x or less and U t = 1 N t (1) is the measure of workers who are unemployed. Thus a …rm (x; n; s t ) which recruits at optimal rate h(x; s t ) makes job o¤ers at rate nh(x; s t )= b G t (x): Given there is a unit mass of workers and letting n t (x)dx = d b G t (x) denote the employment density over productivity rank at date t, aggregating job o¤er rates across all …rms implies the arrival rate of a job o¤er to any given worker is
Furthermore the arrival rate of o¤ers from …rms with type greater than x is
Hence a worker who believes he/she is employed at a …rm with productivity b x has quit rate
We are now in a position to describe the equilibrium wage strategy of …rm (x; n; s): Using (12) in equation (9) , the optimal wage strategy solves:
where N (:) N t (:) in state s = s t : Consider x 2 (0; 1) and, for ease of exposition, assume b
x is di¤erentiable. The necessary …rst order condition for optimality is:
By marginally increasing the wage w, the …rm marginally increases its employees'beliefs b x about its type, which marginally reduces their quit rates. As v(x; s) describes the retention value of each employee, optimality ensures the marginal return to the lower quit rate equals the cost to paying each employee a marginally higher wage. We now identify the equilibrium wage function.
Proposition 4. For given s, a separating equilibrium implies the wage strategy w(:) is the solution to the di¤erential equation:
with initial value w(0; s) = b: Proof: A separating equilibrium requires that the optimal wage w solving the …rst order condition (14) must yield a wage function w = w(x; s) whose inverse function corresponds to b
x(w; s) = x: Using these restrictions in (14) establishes (15) .
To show the solution to the necessary condition for optimal w(:
Hence for any x 0 2 (x; 1]; announcing wage w 0 > w(x; s) increases the total cost of labor to …rm x: The same argument establishes that for any x 0 2 [0; x); the marginal cost to announcing wage w 0 = w(x 0 ; s) < w for …rm x is always negative: Thus announcing wage w = w(x; s) is more pro…table than announcing any other wage w 0 = w(x 0 ; s) for x 0 2 [0; 1]: Suppose instead the …rm announces wage w < w(0; s) = b: To ensure this is not a pro…table deviation, assume its employees believe b x = 0 when w < b: As they anticipate wage w = b at this …rm in the entire future [x = 0 is an absorbing state] they quit into unemployment. As this outcome yields zero pro…t, no …rm announces wage w < b:
Finally suppose the …rm announces w > w(1; s): In that case assume its employees believe b x = 1 and, given those beliefs and resulting quit turnover, announcing wage w(1; s) then strictly dominates paying the higher deviating wage. Hence the optimal wage announcement of any …rm x 2 [0; 1] is identi…ed as the solution to the di¤erential equation (15) with initial value w(0; s) = b. This completes the proof of Proposition 4.
The economic intuition underlying the result is simply that higher productivity …rms enjoy higher employee values v(:) and so are willing to pay marginally more for a reduced quit rate. Equilibrium has an auction structure where for each type x; a too low wage bid yields a costly higher quit rate, while a higher wage bid is not economic as the reduction in quit rate is too small.
Formal De…nition of a Separating Equilibrium.
Fix a rank x 2 [0; 1] and consider the number N t (x) of employed workers in …rms with type no greater than x: Equilibrium turnover implies N t (:) evolves according to:
by (11) where the dot refers to the time derivative @N t =@t and unemployment U t = 1 N t (1): The in ‡ow includes those unemployed who become employed at a …rm no greater than x either because they are unemployed and …nd a job with such a …rm or start-up such a new …rm, plus those employed at …rms with z x but which are hit by an adverse shock x 0 x: The out ‡ow includes job destruction due to …rm death, quits to start new …rms, and worker departures to more productive …rms plus the employment of the …rm ‡ow that experience a su¢ ciently favorable productivity shock. We now formally de…ne a separating equilibrium where s t = N t (:) is the aggregate state variable.
De…nition: Given state s = N (:); a separating equilibrium is a wage policy function, hire rate policy, and equilibrium quit rate such that v(x; N t (:)) and N t (:) are solutions to the system of ordinary di¤erential equations composed of equation (16) together with 4 Homogenous Firms.
Although it is true that the market state N t (:) is of in…nite dimension in the general case, it need not be so in practice. In this section we fully characterize the unique separating equilibrium in the limiting case of homogenous …rms.
In the homogenous …rm case, we suppose p(x) is (arbitrarily close to) p for all x: With (limiting) equal productivity, incentive compatibility implies v(x; N ) cannot depend on x. Let v t = v(x; N t ) denote the value of an employee in each …rm in the limiting case. Optimal recruitment e¤ort h t = h (v t ) is thus also independent of x:
Putting x = 0 in (17) implies:
As the de…nition of equilibrium further implies job o¤er arrival rate:
this di¤erential equation for v t reduces to:
which depends only on v t and the unemployment rate U t : The equilibrium unemployment dynamics are
where the …rst term describes the in ‡ow [job loss through …rm destruction] and the second is out ‡ow through either …rm creation or job creation. Note then that employee value v t and unemployment U t evolve according to the pair of autonomous di¤erential equations (19) and (20). Thus for the limiting case of homogenous …rms, we can restrict the aggregate state vector to s t = U t which is a scalar. The solution of interest, v = v(U ); solves the di¤erential equation
It is well known that a unique continuous solution exists to this equation for all U 2 [0; 1] if and only if the ODE system composed of (19) and (20) has a unique steady state solution and the steady state is a saddle point. Indeed, the branch of the saddle path that converges to the steady state for every initial value of aggregate unemployment describes the equilibrium value of v(:). Below we prove that these necessary and su¢ cient conditions hold. Any steady state solution is the (U; v) pair de…ned by the pair of equations
We …rst show there exists a single solution pair (v; U ) to these equations. Equation (21) describes the U = 0 locus drawn in Figure 1 below. The LHS of (21) is zero at U = + < 1 and decreases at the constant rate + : For any v > 0; the RHS is positive and strictly concave in U for U 2 (0; 1): Hence a unique, positive value of U strictly less than =( + ) exists for every positive value of v. As h (:) is an increasing function, it follows that U decreases as v increases along the locus with limiting properties U ! =( + ) as v ! 0 and U ! 0 as v ! 1:
Equation (22) The dynamics implied by the ODE system composed of (19) and (20) are illustrated by its phase diagram portrayed in Figure 1 . The intersection of the two singular curves is a saddle point that attracts a unique converging saddle path from any initial value of U . Finally, because the growth rate in v on the unstable path above the saddle path must eventually exceed the rate of interest, while the unstable path below the steady state ultimately yields zero v (which contradicts optimal …rm behavior); the stable path represents the only separating equilibrium. This argument thus establishes Theorem 1.
Theorem 1 A unique separating equilibrium exists in the limiting case of equally productive …rms. Further the equilibrium value of an employee v(U ) increases with unemployment.
Equilibrium behaviors depend on the interaction between the value of an employee (which stimulates greater recruitment e¤ort by …rms) and the arrival rate of outside o¤ers t : Note at the steady state the value of an employee is given by
which depends on the arrival rate of outside o¤ers (the only endogenous object). (23) determines steady state v = v ( ) where the higher the arrival rate of outside o¤ers, the lower the value of an employee v ( ): This quit propensity in turn depends on the recruitment e¤ort of competing …rms as
At steady state U; given by equation (21), it is possible to show implied by (24) is an increasing function of v: the higher the value of an employee, the greater the recruitment rate of competing …rms and thus the higher arrival rate of outside o¤ers. This interaction between the value of an employee and competing …rm recruitment strategies ensure a unique steady state. The non-steady state dynamics are interesting. Suppose there is a one-o¤ employment shake-out which increases unemployment above its steady state level. Theorem 1 implies the value of an employee v = v(U ) increases which, in turn, increases …rm recruitment rates h = h (v(U )): At …rst sight this seems empirically unlikely -that hiring rates are counter-cyclical (increasing with unemployment). It should be noted, however, that this response is necessary for the stability of the economy: if recruitment rates were to fall as unemployment increases, then unemployment would continue to increase. It is particularly interesting, then, that Yashiv (2011) …nds empirically that the hiring rate (H/N) in the U.S. is indeed countercyclical in this sense. The model's corresponding implication for the cyclicality of gross hiring ‡ows
Note that any common and unanticipated positive shock to the productivity of a match p shifts up the _ v = 0 curve in Figure 1 . The result is an increase in the steady state value of an employee (v) and a decrease in unemployment (U ) as in the canonical search and matching model. Along the adjustment path, the equilibrium value of v jumps up initially and adjusts slowly downward along the path converging to the new steady state value. This implies quit turnover also jumps up to a favorable aggregate productivity shock: …rms increase their recruitment e¤ort and workers in low rank …rms are more likely to receive a preferred outside o¤er. The initially large increase in job-to-job turnover gradually falls, however, as the economy converges to the new steady state.
It is straightforward to back out equilibrium micro-behavior. The di¤er-ential equation (15) for equilibrium wages simpli…es to
which, given initial value w(0; N t (:)) = b; yields
This expression describes equilibrium wage dispersion in the limiting case of homogenous …rms. Speci…cally, w(:) is increasing in x, where w(0; s) = b is the lowest wage paid. Wage dispersion arises as hiring is costly and …rms o¤er di¤erent wages to reduce their employee quit rates. As in BM, the wages o¤ered are ranked by productivity x where higher ranked …rms pay higher wages and enjoy lower quit rates. Unlike BM, however, there is no simple correlation between wages and …rm size. The equilibrium quit rate from …rm (x; N t (:)) is
which is decreasing in x; being h (v(U t )) ln U t at x = 0 (the bottom rank …rm) and zero at x = 1. Note a …rm's equilibrium quit rate depends directly on the level of unemployment. This occurs as …rms are more likely to recruit from the pool of unemployed workers the larger is that pool. The expected growth rate of employment depends only on whether or not unemployment U exceeds its steady state value. There is, however, dispersion in individual …rm growth rates: a rank x …rm enjoys expected growth rate
Consistent with Gibrat's law, a …rm's growth rate is independent of its size n but depends critically on its productivity rank x (which is subject to shocks) and the level of unemployment. High productivity (rank) …rms pay high wages and attract workers both from the unemployment pool and from low wage …rms. Such …rms grow over time, while low rank …rms contract. Firm size n(x; t) thus evolves according to a geometric Markov process where …rms with x satisfying U + N (x) > 1=e ' 0:37 have positive expected growth rates. Thus if unemployment exceeds 37% this condition implies all existing …rms have positive expected growth rates. Finally note that currently large …rms must typically have existed for a longer time, have enjoyed higher than average growth rates, and, consequently, have been more productive.
Heterogeneous Firms.
This section generalizes the analysis to a …nite number of …rm types. Let Note unemployment U = 1 N I . Let w i = w(x i ; N (:)) denote the wage paid by …rm x = x i . Conditional on …rm type j receiving a productivity shock, let jk denote the probability its type becomes k: Assume the jk are consistent with …rst order stochastic dominance and 11 = 1 [the lowest productivity state is an absorbing state (till …rm death)].
Proposition 5. A separating equilibrium implies w i are de…ned recursively by
The value of a type i …rm solves:
Proof. In any separating equilibrium, (11) implies
Now consider type i …rms. For x 2 (x i 1 ; x i ] such …rms have productivity p i : As each type i …rm has the same value then, to ensure equal pro…t, the equilibrium wage equation has to satisfy
for all such x. Putting x = x i and using (27) yields the stated recursion for w i : As this recursion implies
the di¤erential equation for v i follows by putting x = x i in equation (17) in the de…nition of equilibrium. This completes the proof of Proposition 5. Using equation (16), it follows the N i evolve according to:
where 0i is the probability that a new …rm is initially of type i or less. 
where > 0 indexes the length of a "period" and next period N 0 is given by
As
is an equilibrium vector of value functions. Our strategy is to show that v(N) exists for every small > 0. As we demonstrate that it lies in a compact metric space, every sequence fv(N) g !0 , has a convergent subsequence in the supnorm.
First, we establish that the transform M maps bounded functions into bounded function under Assumption 1 and p i > b. Namely, for any v(N) (v; :::; v) where v is the scalar de…ned by equation (6),
by substitution from equation (6) . Further, as p i > p i 1 one can easily show
As h (v) is a di¤erentiable function with bounded derivatives on (0; v], equation (7) and the derivatives of ln
are bounded for all N i N I < 1, the continuous transformation M maps the set of bounded, positive, di¤erentiable, and Lipschitz continuous function v(N) into itself. As this set is a compact metric space under the supnorm, at least one …xed point with these properties exists by Schauder's Fixed Point Theorem for every > 0.
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Finally, consider any in…nite sequence fv(N) g with ! 0. As every element is a bounded real vector function a subsequence that converges in the supnorm exists and this limit, say v(N), satis…es all the equilibrium conditions by construction. This comment completes the proof.
Wage and Productivity Dispersion
The aim of this section is to derive conditions under which the model generates wage and productivity dispersion which is consistent with matched employer-employee data such as that available for Danish manufacturing. The empirical employment weighted distributions of the average hourly …rm wages paid (annual wage bill divided by employment measured in annual standard hours worked) and hourly labor productivity (annual value added per standard hour worked) for four di¤erent Danish manufacturing industries are illustrated by the two solid lines in Figure 2 .
3 Note that the general shapes of the distributions are quite similar across industries. In all four cases, average …rm wage dispersion is characterized by a distribution with single interior mode and some upper tail skew but less than the distributions of labor productivity.
4 Figure 3 presents the cross …rm wage-productivity relationship in each of the four industries where the solid line represents the nonparametric regression point estimate and the shaded area is the 90% con…dence interval. Obviously, there is a strong positive relationship between the two, as our theory predicts. Further, the pro…le is roughly linear over most of the mass of the productivity distribution but with diminishing slope that tends to zero in the extreme right tail. 5 In this section we demonstrate that the formal model can provide a coherent explanation for these general features of the data.
We focus on steady state so that unemployment and the distribution of employment across …rms are consistent with …rm and worker turnover. We also abstract from the idiosyncratic shock to productivity by setting = 0:
We motivate this restriction by noting that …rm productivity is quite persistent and that there is a strong positive correlation between the average wage paid and …rm size in …rm data. Our model need not generate either correlation if is very large. Speci…cally as all start-up …rms are initially small, any currently large …rm must have enjoyed high growth rates in the past. If were large so that …rm productivity is not very persistent, then the predicted correlation between current wages paid and …rm size is correspondingly small. Conversely, if is su¢ ciently small, then large …rms remain highly productive for long period, thus yielding the observed positive correlation between …rm size and wage paid. In steady state with = 0; (16) implies N (x) satis…es:
where, by (11) , the quit rate is
The Bellman equation (1) and the Envelope Theorem imply
while the wage equation solves
The aim is to determine whether these restrictions are consistent with he empirical observations summarized in Figures 2 and 3 Figure 3 describes the empirical wage-…rm productivity relationship e w(p) = w(x) where x = (p). The slope is identi…ed in the model as d e w dp
Di¤erentiating (29) with respect to x and simplifying yields
Using this and (32) then implies Now consider the distribution of wages paid across workers. De…ne z(:) by z(w(x)) = U +N (x) as the fraction of workers who are either unemployed or employed at a wage no greater than w. Di¤erentiating with respect to x and using (32) yields
Di¤erentiating again with respect to x and simplifying:
Using (31) to substitute out v 0 (x); letting = v h dh dv denote the elasticity of the optimal hire rate with respect to the value of an employee yields
The bracketed term determines whether the density of wages paid is increasing or decreasing. If d e w=dp decreases with p [as implied by the data] then the bracketed term is strictly decreasing in x and so any interior mode, if it exists, must be unique. We thus obtain the following proposition. 
i where x = (p): Thus 0 0 (p) su¢ ciently large ensures z 00 > 0 for p small enough. Furthermore 0 0 (p) ! 0 as p ! p ensures z 00 < 0 for p large enough and so the mode must be interior. Restriction (iii) ensures does not depend on x. If (iii)-(iv) also hold, then the term in the square brackets on the RHS of (34) is strictly decreasing and so implies a unique mode.
Propositions 6 and 7 suggest the key to explaining the shapes of the empirical wage distributions z(w) and the wage/productivity pro…les e w(p) is a distribution of productivity 0 (p) across new start-ups which has a decreasing density over most of its support. Thus most new start-ups su¤er low productivity draws and struggle to grow. Conversely a relatively small number of start-ups enjoy high productivity draws and grow quickly over time. Note this restriction is also consistent with the unimodal employment weighted distribution of productivity, e N (p), as illustrated in Figure 2 . As e N (p) = N ( (p)); the above implies d e N dp
with x = (p): As the …rst term, which is the average number of workers employed by a …rm of productivity p, is increasing in x = (p); the distribution e N (p) has an interior mode as long as 
Conclusion.
We have shown the introduction of a hiring margin into the matching framework with on-the-job search yields a surprisingly rich and tractable equilibrium setting in a model with …rm heterogeneity in productivity. We have fully characterized and established the existence of Markov perfect (Bayesian) equilibria in non-steady state economies where …rms have private information on their own productivity. The environment considered is particularly rich. There is turnover of …rms with new start-up companies replacing existing …rms that su¤er …rm destruction shocks. There is labor turnover where, in equilibrium, workers quit less productive …rms to take employment in more productive …rms. Equilibrium wage dispersion arises as more productive …rms are willing to pay a higher wage to reduce their employee's quit rates. Furthermore, …rm growth rates are size independent where higher productivity …rms pay higher wages, enjoy low quit rates and recruit more new employees. Hence, su¢ ciently high productivity …rm have a positive expected growth rate. The structure also allows for …rm speci…c productivity shocks, so that previously successful …rms may ultimately decline should they receive a su¢ ciently unfavorable sequence of productivity draws. Finally, the model provides a coherent explanation for the properties of …rm wage and productivity distributions as well as the cross section relationship between them.
The characterization of equilibrium is particularly simple in the limiting case of equally productive …rms. Even though the distribution of …rm sizes is in…nitely dimensional, equilibrium aggregate behavior depends only on the level of unemployment. A particularly useful insight is that the value of a …rm is increasing in the level of unemployment. This occurs as, with higher unemployment, …rms are less likely to poach each others'employees. As greater employee value generates greater recruitment e¤ort by …rms, the non-steady state dynamics of the economy are intrinsically stable. This result appears consistent with the U.S. business cycle where Yashiv (2011) …nds the aggregate hiring rate (H/N) does indeed covary positively with unemployment.
This new, rich, and tractable framework opens up several important directions for future research. The equally productive …rms case is important as equilibrium dichotomizes into (i) macroeconomic behavior where, depending only on the level of unemployment U , equilibrium determines gross job creation rates and (ii) microeconomic behavior where wages and quit turnover at the …rm level depends on a (possibly transitory) …rm …xed e¤ect x; the collective recruitment e¤ort of …rms (determined in the macroequilibrium) and the distribution of …rm sizes which itself evolves endogenously over time.
Given the Markov structure of the model, it is clear it will generalize to a framework where aggregate productivity and job destruction parameter evolve according to a stochastic Markov process. The extension is interesting not only because …rms use optimal wage setting strategies, rather than Nash bargaining, but also because the insights of Coles and Moghaddasi (2011) suggest this framework will …t the business cycle volatility and persistence data as described in Shimer (2005) . Indeed the model will automatically generate procyclical quit turnover: high aggregate productivity will increase …rm hiring rates, thus increasing worker quits from the lower end of the productivity distribution. Furthermore periods of high unemployment will have lower quit rates as newly available jobs are more likely to be …lled by the unemployed.
An important distinction between this paper and the BM approach is that in the latter framework the wage has two functions: a higher wage both attracts new employees and retains existing ones. Here instead, the hiring margin is fully targeted by the …rm's recruitment strategy, leaving wages to target only the quit margin. The properties of the resulting equilibrium wage structure is correspondingly di¤erent. Speci…cally, the (steady state) density of wages paid is unimodal given the shape of the …rm wage-productivity pro…le observed in Danish data and that shape is consistent with the model under plausible restrictions on the form of the distribution of productivity of entering …rms. Furthermore, the model's equilibrium dynamics addresses wage distribution evolution over the cycle, an important topic for future empirical research. 
